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A B S T R A C T  
T h i s  p a p er  r ep r es en t s  a n  ex p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e c a u s es  o f  t h e d ec el er a t i o n  i n  l a b o u r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
i n  t h e E u r o p ea n  ec o n o m i es  i n  t h e l a s t  f ew  d ec a d es .   In  t h e f i r s t  i n s t a n c e,  t h e w ea k n es s  o f  
d o m es t i c  d em a n d  i s  w h a t  d et er m i n es  t h a t  s l o w i n g  d o w n  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  H o w ev er ,  t h e d i f -
f er en c es  i n  t h e ( m ed i o c r e)  r a t es  o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  g r o w t h  i n  t h e E u r o p ea n  c o u n t r i es  a r e r el a t ed  
t o  t h e s p ec i f i c  c h a r a c t er i s t i c s  o f  t h ei r  r es p ec t i v e l a b o u r  m a r k et s .   In  t h i s  w a y ,  i n  a  c o n t ex t  o f  
w ea k n es s  i n  d o m es t i c  d em a n d ,  t h er e i s  a  t r a d e-o f f  b et w een  l a b o u r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  em -
p l o y m en t  g r o w t h .   
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This paper presents an alternative explanation to the one offered by the neoclassical mainstream 
on the causes of deceleration in growth in labour productivity in the European economies during the 
last few decades. In the first instance, the weakness of domestic demand is what determines that slow-
down in productivity. However, the differences between the (mediocre) productivity growth rates are 
related to the specific characteristics of their respective labour markets. In this way, in a context of 
weakness in domestic demand, the larger or smaller amount of work incorporated in the economic 
growth generates a trade-off with the performance of productivity. 
The work is divided into six sections. The first lays out the main reasons why the mainstream ex-
planation for labour productivity is unsatisfactory. The second puts forward an alternative theoretical 
approach in which the demand dynamic is the structural conditioner of the pattern which productivity 
follows. The third section analyses the empirical evidence which relates demand and productivity in 
the European economies between 1960 and 2004. The fourth section examines the characteristics of 
the labour markets which lead to economic growth incorporating a larger or smaller amount of work. 
The fifth section presents the different styles of economic growth in terms of labour content and pro-
ductivity performance. The final section synthesises the conclusions obtained in the previous sections. 
The countries considered (EU-14) are those which made up the European Union before the latest 
enlargements, with the exception of Luxembourg. The distribution of the periods between 1960-2004 
does not follow the conventional rounding up of fifties or decades, instead it corresponds to the evolu-
tion of the economic cycles in the European economies during that period. 1960-73 is the final phase 
of the strong expansion which characterised the Golden Age, followed by the period of crisis 1974-83. 
Afterwards, each of the cyclical periods of 1984-93 and 1994-2004 includes respective phases of ex-
pansion and recession1. The main source of statistical information used in the work is Annual-
Macroeconomic Database (AMECO) which is compiled by the Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission.  
 
1. THE DISTORTED FOCUS OF THE MAINSTREAM 
Most studies on productivity performance focus on supply which is characteristic of neoclassical 
theory. Briefly summarised, the main features which those studies contain can be distilled into six 
points2. Firstly: the analysis is conducted through aggregate production functions which define the 
economy’s balance in the long-term. Secondly: productivity growth is separated between the varia-
tions in capital intensity (capital-labour ratio), which expresses the dynamic of the accumulation of 
                                               
     
1
  In Palazuelos (2006) the methodology is explained which has been used to establish the cyclical periods 
considered in this work. 
 
 
     
2
  Wolf (1997) includes an extensive selection of works by the main authors which analyse productivity from 
a neoclassical theory such as Solow, Denison, Griliches, Abramovitz, Jorgenson, Baumol and others. 
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factors, and the total productivity of the factors, which expresses the global efficiency generated by 
technical progress3. Thirdly: although capital intensity in the long-term, in a static state, is considered 
constant, the majority of work which analyses productivity in the nineties coincides in highlighting 
that the fundamental determiner is the new information and communication technologies (ICT) be-
cause they increase both the capital intensity of the sectors which produce those technologies as well 
as total productivity through the diffusion in sectors which use such technologies4. 
Fourthly: the strengthening of technological capital (through research and development efforts) 
and of human capital (centred on higher education) is found to be closely related to the innovation and 
diffusion of ICT5. Fifthly: macroeconomic stability and institutional flexibility also favour the diffu-
sion of ICT and, in general, act as an important stimulus to the improvement in the total productivity 
of factors. Stability is guaranteed through the orthodox management of economic policy in order to 
control the public deficit and inflation. Flexibility is guaranteed through the liberalisation of markets 
in order to establish a predictable economic framework which facilitates the creation of companies and 
the entry of foreign capital6. In particular, the absence of regulations in the labour market favours the 
generation and mobility of employment, which redounds in a greater efficiency in the labour market7. 
Sixthly: the favourable performance of productivity is exemplified in the evolution of the United States 
from the middle of the nineties. This is the way in which the acceleration of the pace of growth of its 
productivity through the strong impulse of ICT is referred to, benefiting from the technological push 
and the improvement in human capital in a context of macro stability and flexible markets. As Fred 
Bergten, director of the Institute for International Economics stated in 1997: “[The American model] 
…is definitely better for everybody”. 
That interpretation was developed in the United States during the late nineties in academic and 
professional circles tied to the Federal Reserve and the National Bureau of Economic Research, later 
being adopted by international organisations like the IMF and the OECD and becoming the uniform 
discourse of the majority of institutes and research departments and of circles of political power. It is 
the same vision as the one which in Europe runs through the Pact for Stability and Growth, the “Lis-
bon Strategy” approved by the European Council in 2002 and the subsequent evaluations carried out 
by the Commission (Sapir report) and the Council (the Kok Report) of the European Union. 
                                               
     
3
  The standard formula is: ∆ y/l = α ∆k/l + ∆a, so that the rate of variation of labour productivity is equiva-
lent to the sum of the variations of the capital intensity (considered by the participation of capital in income) and 
the technical progress.  
     
4
  Among the extensive literatura available, five representative works are: Jorgenson (2002), Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (2000), Bartelsman and Doms. (2002), Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) and Oliner and Sichel (2000).   
     
5
  On the importante of human capital: Bassanini and Scarpetta. (2001), Black and Lynch (1996), Nelson and 
Phelps (1996) and OCDE (2004). 
     
6
  On the influence on the macroeconomic context: Ahm and Hemmings (2000), Blanchard and Giovazzi 
(2003) and OCDE (2004).  
     
7
 On the relationship between the institutions and the labour market on labour productivity: Layard et al 
(1991), Baily and Kirkegaard (2004), Blanchard (2001, 2004), Dew-Becker and Gordon (2006) and Nickell and 
Layard (1998). 
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Nevertheless, that direct causal link between the ICT, the liberalisation of the markets and growth 
in labour productivity comes up against certain conflicting points when it is set beside some data. We 
will limit ourselves to underlining the three following conflicting points. The first is that when produc-
tivity levels are calculated per hour of work -in dollars according to the parity purchasing power- the 
United States does not come top but has been behind three European countries (Belgium, the Nether-
lands, France) for decades, and in the last few years it has also been behind Ireland, while Germany 
and Austria reach similar levels to the American levels. Therefore the “technological frontier” is set by 
those countries without them standing out – not even within Europe – for the generation and diffusion 
of ICT, nor for R&D efforts or higher education. 
In second place, when the United States’ economy is analysed one of the elements which stands 
out since the nineties is the importance which the foreign deficit has on the growth dynamic. Fre-
quently that fact is referred to as an exceptional situation due to the position which the USA occupies 
in the world economy and above all in international financial markets. However, the recognition of 
this exceptional feature disappears completely when the evolution of American productivity is ana-
lysed and when it is compared with what takes place in the European economies. The theoretical limi-
tations imposed by the supply focus based on production functions means that the decisive importance 
of this constant increase in domestic demand through the widening of its external disequilibrium is 
completely ignored. 
In the third place, when the growth of investment in new technologies (ICTI) and  labour produc-
tivity during the second half of the nineties are analysed evident paradoxes spring up. Finland registers 
ICTI increases which are double those of Greece (average annual rates of 16% and 8%), but both 
countries have similar growth in labour productivity per hours worked. The ICTI increase of Portugal 
and Austria is even less (5-6% annually), yet its productivity exceeds that of Finland. While the ICTI 
of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands grow at a similar rate, the productivity increase of the UK 
is substantially greater than that of the Netherlands. The same is true of Spain and Austria which have 
similar rates of ICTI growth, but whereas Spain has the lowest increase in productivity in the EU, 
Austria’s is among the highest. 
The same lack of a causal link can be seen when technological effort and productivity are com-
pared8, or when the synthetic indicator which the OECD has developed as “Investment in Knowledge” 
is used, in which expenditure on R&D, expenditure on higher education and investment in software 
are considered. Therefore, the data does not show a really clear and direct relationship between ICT 
and labour productivity. Nor does it show one between the larger or weaker “flexibility” of markets 
                                               
     
8
 The same happens when the technological effort and productivity in 1994-2004 is compared with that of 
1984-93 in a single country. Only in half the countries in the EU-14 is a parallel performance found in both vari-
ables. The two variables do not perform in parallel in Spain, Portugal, Finland, Belgium and Denmark. An in-
crease in technological effort is not matched by a larger increase in labour efficiency, nor is it matched in the 
Netherlands where the inverse situation is produced. It is no less paradoxical that the two countries which make a 
technological effort far greater than the rest, Sweden and Finland, obtain productivity increases which are infe-
rior to those registered by various countries which come behind in rankings on R&D expenditure. 
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and productivity. The most evident example is in the United Kingdom, whose level of liberalisation 
since the Thatcher years even exceeds that of the USA in many aspects and yet productivity growth is 
lower than that of Austria, Finland, Greece or Sweden, countries with significantly more regulated 
markets. 
Those conflicting points give rise to serious doubts about the explanation provided by the main-
stream, but its analysis is all the more profoundly unsatisfactory since its roots are based in a school of 
thought whose premises are clearly contradictory to the facts observed in the economic reality and yet, 
despite that, the theory is used to understand the reality and also even to set out courses of action. The 
playing out of the fantasy to which that academic tradition continues to be subjected continues to run 
its course, and repeating its traditional litany when it studies labour productivity. With respect to that 
study, there are three main criticisms. 
The first criticism concerns the way in which productivity growth is broken up with the aim of 
concentrating the impact of technological progress in the component of total productivity of factors, 
considering that the capital-labour ratio represents a uniform accumulation of factors. However, it is 
not logical to sustain that there is no incorporation of technical progress in the K/L dynamic. If that 
assumption is rejected, the “total productivity” component again has the doubtful significance which 
residual had in the first Solow formula before it was associated with technology9. 
The second criticism is concerning the direct causality relationship established between technol-
ogy and productivity. This end-of-the-century discovery favoured with a Schumpeter-esque flavour by 
traditional neoclassical authors remains substantially far away from the interpretative proposals of 
specialists who study the evolution of technology, such as Pavit, freeman, Soete, Dosi, Chandler or 
Rosenberg, whose formulas assume a greater complexity and weaker immediate link in that relation-
ship. Some, such as the historian of technology Tunzalman (2000), are more emphatic in stressing that 
technology and productivity are separate entities which move at different times and which can even 
head in opposite directions. The elements which mediate in the relation of that binomial are diverse, 
operate in a discontinuous way over time and generate notable spatial differences between countries 
and/or regions. All that is, however, ignored in the pan-technologist version which predominates the 
analysis of productivity since the end of the nineties.  
The third is a continuation of the previous criticism and is to do with the fact that the simplifica-
tion of the connection between technology and productivity is even more exaggerated when technical 
progress is subsumed into what happens with new information and communication technologies. It is 
one thing to stress their importance in economic and social life since the nineties and quite another to 
consider technical progress exclusively through ICT, which gives the technologist interpretation an 
                                               
     
9
  Lipsey and Carlaw (2000) provide an extensive list to the "total productivity of factors". 
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exponential degree of exaggeration10. The distortion is so clear that when many of those studies refer 
to the importance of research and education – as elements which promote labour efficiency – they only 
relate them to the generation and diffusion of ICT. 
Therefore, the interpretative hypothesis offered by works immersed in that academic tradition suf-
fer from a distorted focus when they address productivity. The focus of the analysis is placed on a 
reduced number of variables whose behaviour is predetermined by theoretical premises and by the 
format of specific models stemming from the neoclassical aggregated function. That analytical distor-
tion is translated into the diagnostic of the European situation and to the proposals which are formu-
lated to improve labour efficiency. 
 
2. AN ALTERNATIVE FOCUS FOR ANALYSING PRODUCTIVITY  
From a general point of view, there is no doubt that investment in new technologies, educational 
level and institutions influence the development of labour productivity. Not only that, but from an 
analytical perspective which accepts the existence of long cycles in the historic trajectory of capitalism 
it seems evident that waves of technological changes and institutional changes which are concentrated 
in determined historical moments are those which determine the creation of new periods of prosperity, 
incorporating a greater level of productivity efficiency. But not even in those moments of sharp trans-
formations, such as the post-war decades known as the Golden Age, did those techno-institutional 
changes deliver an adequate explanation on the productivity dynamic. 
In an economy which functions in conditions of full use of its productive potential, the identity 
which relates the rise in production with the variations in employment and labour productivity can be 
expressed as a causal relationship of the type {∆L + ∆Y/L}  ∆Y . However, in real terms, that situa-
tion is manifestly exceptional given that economies almost always operate below the full use of their 
resources. In this case, hypotheses from the tradition which feeds on Keynesian and Kaleckian theories 
make a lot of sense, as far as they consider that the level which effective production reaches compared 
to potential production is determined by the size of aggregate demand11. 
That being the case, variations in productivity are determined in the first instance by the perform-
ance of aggregate demand. Therefore, if ∆DE  ∆YE  the identity ∆Y ≡ ∆L + ∆Y/L does not allow the 
establishment a priori of any causal relationship, rather – in the face of a concrete demand dynamic – 
the increase in production admits a combination of variations between employment and productivity. 
As a consequence, the larger or smaller amount of work generated by the economic growth in each 
                                               
     
10
  It would be fitting to make an analogy between the artificiality  of the stock exchange rise of ITC compa-
nies and the distorted theoretical extrapolation given to the importance of these technologies, with the important 
observation that the stock exchange bubble burst in 2000, returning the listings to more realistic values while the 
analytic exaggeration has been maintained.  
     
11
  Representative works of that tradition are: Cornwall (1994), Eatwell (1996), Marglin and Schor (1990), 
Mitchell et al. (2006), Setterfield (2002) and Stockbammer (2004).  
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country and in each period is to be found narrowly related to the factors which influence the function-
ing of the labour market. 
Therefore, the analysis of the dynamic which labour productivity follows presents two levels of 
determination. In the first instance, the aggregate demand which – determining the effective produc-
tion 12– mediates the performance of productivity through three channels: 
a) Scaling effect: the increase in the market by any of the components, private or public, of de-
mand allows a larger use of the installed capacity, through the reduction of the capital-output ratio 
[∆Y/L ≡ ∆K/L  ─ ∆K/Y]. 
b) Capitalisation effect: Non-residential investment promotes the subsequent increase in the po-
tential supply through a larger granting of productive capital, increasing the capital-labour ratio. 
c) Modernisation effect: the increase in capital stock is not uniform from a technological point o 
view, rather that level is increased through the incorporation of technical innovations, organisational 
improvements and learning by doing, resulting in a rise in capital intensity and/or a decrease in the 
capital-output ratio13. 
In the second instance, in the face of either an expansive or recessive context in demand, the pro-
ductivity varies depending on the elements which influence the rate of employment. 
On one hand, the evolution of the labour force participation rate (labour force / total population) 
is influenced by demographical factors – including migratory flows – and by social and institutional 
factors which affect the willingness of certain segments of society (women, young people) to partici-
pate in the labour market 14. On the other hand, the rate of employment relates the level of people em-
ployed to the labour force (ER = E/LF). This rate is conditioned by the factors which act from the sup-
ply side (the willingness of people of a working age to become active workers and the willingness of 
unemployed active individuals to look for work) and from the labour demand side (the expectations of 
businesses, wage earners and other institutional aspects which affect labour costs). 
Therefore, the dynamic of demand, which may be more or less expansive, conditions the capacity 
for growth in the economy, but it only partly conditions productivity results given that the amount of 
work which growth creates also depends on factors which influence the rate of employment. Taking 
into account that demand context, therefore, there exists a trade-off between growth in employment 
                                               
     
12
  In their turn, different schools integrated in the Keynesian-Kaleckian tradition provide different responses 
to the elements which determine aggregate demand performance. A good sample of that plurality is found in 
Setterfield (2002).  
     
13
  Certainly, from the empirical point of view, at a macroeconomic level, it is not possible to ascertain to 
what extent investment generates capitalisation effects or modernisation effects (the proxis which are used are 
too basic), but even though it is still possible to defend that we are dealing with two distinctive routes which part 
from the assumption that demand influences labour productivity.  
     
14
  LFprate = LF/P = (LF/LFpop) * (LFpop/P), LF being the labour force, LFpop the population of working 
age and P the total population. Therefore, the variation in activity rate depends on the demographic changes 
which influence LFpop/P and on the social and institutional changes which affect LF / LFpop). 
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and growth in productivity, so that in the presence of a ∆DE  ∆YE relationship there is an inverse 
relationship between labour increases and productivity15.   
 
  
3. DOMESTIC DEMAND AS A STRUCTURAL LIMIT TO LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH: 1974-2004. 
3.1. Weakening of domestic demand: evidence and reasons 
The data in table 1 reveals an incontestable fact: an intense deceleration in domestic demand takes 
place in European countries from 1974 while exports and imports maintained a larger pace of 
growth16. That strong deceleration was shared by all the EU-14 countries, except Ireland which in the 
last period saw exceptional growth, determined by the massive inflow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by large transnational corporations, mainly electronics and chemical-pharmaceuticals17. Leaving 
that exception aside, no other country recorded average growth above 3 percent annually. In fact, in 
the majority of the countries the growth rate kept falling period on period and in very few cases ex-
ceeded that 3 percent average in any period; no country did so between 1974-83, two did so in 1984-
93 and four in 1994-2004. 
We are not dealing, therefore, with episodic shocks in which economic activity temporarily con-
tracts but with a continued period of several decades in which the economic dynamic undergoes a 
severe restriction in terms of domestic demand. That restriction affects private consumption and public 
demand but has been all the more rigorous in the gross creation of fixed capital – above all foreign 
investment – whose growth has suffered a strong slowdown, reaching moderate rates even during 
phases of stronger economic dynamism. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
     
15
  From different perspectives, authors like Buchele and Christiansen (1999) and Gordon (1997) have pro-
posed that there is an inverse relationship between the evolution of employment and productivity.  
     
16
  As an average of the 14 countries, in 1974-2004 the average rates of growth in exports and imports of 
goods and services were, respectively 5.4% and 4.9% annually, while the rate of growth in domestic demand 
(excluding stocks) was 2.3 percent annually. Calculations stem from AMECO. 
     
17
  The massive inflow of FDI between 1995 and 2000 – 70% of which comes from the United States – was 
concentrated in the financial sector and in industry. Within that, 71% was made in electrical-electronics produc-
tion and chemical-pharmaceuticals. In precise terms, the intense growth in the Irish economy is based on finance 
and industry, with annual average growth of 31% and 38% respectively. In those years the two sectors have 
increased their joint proportion of industry from 37% to 57%, also concentrating 60% of investment in the sector 
and 62% of exports. Foreign capital makes up 94% of investment and almost all exports in those two sectors. 
The influence of transnational corporations is still greater because of its notable presence in sectors such as food 
and graphic arts, and greater still in finance and commercial distribution. Therefore, the determining factor in the 
Irish growth has been an exogenous character, the decision of transnational corporations to set up in that small 
European country which offered various advantages in terms of location. Source: Central Statistics Office Ire-
land, http://www.cso.ie 
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Table 1. Evolution of Domestic demand and productivity. Average rates of annual variation in each period. 
 
1960-
1973 
1974-
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994-
2004 
1960-
1973 
1974-
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994-
2004 
 
DOMESTIC DEMAND (excluding stocks) PRODUCTIVITY (per hour worked) 
Austria 4.9 2.4 2.4 1.7 5.6 3.2 2.3 2.7 
Belgium 4.7 1.7 2.3 2.0 6.1 3.2 2.2 1.6 
Denmark 5.2 1.1 1.7 2.6 3.7 2.2 2.7 1.6 
Finland 5.1 2.6 0.4 3.3 5.1 3.1 3.1 2.3 
France 5.6 2.2 2.3 2.2 5.4 3.9 2.2 2.0 
Germany a 4.6 1.5 2.8 1.1 5.2 2.8 2.6 1.8 
Greece 7.8 1.5 1.5 3.9 9.5 1.3 0.8 2.9 
Ireland 5.1 2.4 2.0 6.5 5.1 4.2 4.0 4.4 
Italy 5.4 2.4 2.2 1.7 6.5 2.7 2.3 1.0 
Netherlands 5.0 1.5 2.3 2.6 4.7 3.5 0.8 1.2 
Portugal 6.7 2.3 3.6 2.8 7.3 3.6 3.5 2.1 
Spain 7.6 1.5 3.5 3.9 6.1 4.2 2.3 0.7 
Sweden 3.9 1.1 1.4 2.0 4.7 1.5 1.6 2.4 
United Kingdom 3.2 1.0 2.7 3.4 3.8 2.6 2.2 2.1 
a) In order to guarantee the coherence of the data prior to and after reunification in 1990, the series of the period 
1984-93 has been created from 1991 by applying the variation rates of the unified country to the FDR data. 
Drawn up from Annual-Macroeconomic Database (AMECO) and Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
(GGDC) Database. 
 
The reasons which explain that anaemic growth, in the words of Aglietta and Berrebi (2007), are 
to do with the interaction between various factors, among those which stand out a) the falling back of 
the profit rate in the industrial sector in the seventies, b) the growth of financial power, and c) the re-
strictive character of budgetary and monetary policies applies since the eighties. Those factors led to 
the breakdown of that institutional network constructed during the Golden Age which stimulated the 
virtuous interaction between aggregate demand growth, productivity increase and income redistribu-
tion. The social pact between employers and employees guaranteed the generation and distribution of 
productivity and real wages, which had at the same time a very positive effect on investment and con-
sumption. The political pact established by the extension of the welfare state committed governments 
to demand management and income redistribution. The international pact established in Bretton 
Woods, based in currency stability and control over capital movements in order to favour the expan-
sion of international trade and national autonomy of monetary policies in order to favour economic 
growth. 
a) The slump in the profit rate in industry hatched at the end of the seventies and deepened during 
the subsequent decade as the symptoms of the exhaustion of the accumulation model of the Golden 
Age began appearing18. That fall in relative business profit rate broke the pace of growth in industrial 
investment and encouraged its move towards other countries and towards other activities and other 
forms of obtaining better profitability and of escaping the regulations established by those govern-
ments. 
                                               
     
18
  See Marglin and Schor (1990), Brenner (2002) and Palazuelos (2006). 
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b) Financial supremacy became the hallmark of the economy as growing masses of money rotated 
quickly with the soul aim of obtaining short-term gains. The rapid increase in financial capital increas-
ingly conditioned other forms of investment. In large companies shareholder value became supreme, 
giving way to short-term profitability strategies limited to the search for quick profits to share out 
among shareholders. As a consequence, the reference variables which determine companies strategies 
are those which define investment in the capital markets, in other words, stock market quotations, 
interest rates of other financial assets, exchange rates and inflation19. The strengthening of financial 
activity brings with it the growing influence of the large banks and other financial institutions since 
they receive a growing part of the business profits, influence economic policies and manage to ensure 
that the relationship between savings and consumption of the domestic sector is subordinate to the 
relationship between financial investment and financial debt. 
To sum up, financialisation means that the coordinates of the economic dynamic are tied to the 
strategies, agents and operations of a financial character, causing grave consequences. Investment in 
productive activities loses relevance and its viability is dependent on the computing of profitability it 
offers compared to financial investments. Mergers and acquisitions of companies become financial 
business, as do the breaking up and purchase and sales of production lines. Large companies convert 
the management of their treasuries into gains through investments and sales of financial assets. Short-
term profitability demands consistent reduction in labour costs, which becomes an obsessive and per-
manent objective. The growth of home consumption remains at the expense of their financial invest-
ments and of their possibility to increase their debt level since salary rises are limited. 
c) At the same time, European governments opt for economic policies based on orthodox budget-
ing, monetary restrictions and the liberalisation of markets, assuming the business discourse, above all 
financial, which advocated the elimination of controls on capital movement, the reduction of taxes, the 
minimising of public expenditure and the fight against inflation as a priority and permanent goal20. 
The decline in budgetary activity began in the eighties in several countries (Belgium, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom and Ireland) and became generalised throughout the EU from 1992 when 
the Maastricht Treaty established a limitation on the public deficit as a prerequisite for creating the 
monetary unit, at the same time as the governments reduced fiscal pressure. Since then, tax cuts have 
been made and public expenditure commitments have been reduced, to the extent that the majority of 
European governments achieved positive, null or lightly in-deficit balances, apart from Germany, 
France and Portugal where imbalances have remained above 3% of GDP. The imposing of that budg-
eting orthodoxy led to the weakening of redistributive policies, the containment of public demand and, 
with that, its drivers towards consumption and private investment. 
                                               
     
19
  On the financialisation of the economy: Aglietta and Rebérioux (2004), Aglietta and Berrebi (2007), 
Chesnais (1994),  Plihon (2003), Epstein (2005) and Duménil and Levy (1999). 
      
20
 On the economy policies: Arestis et al  (2005), Stockbammer (2004), Hein and Truger (2005, 2006), Bi-
bow (2001), Pasinetti (1998), Aglietta (2007) and Modigliani (2000).  
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The uniformity of the governmental behaviour was all the greater in monetary policy. In the eight-
ies a pendulum reaction took place in the face of the monetary laissez-faire of the previous decade 
when most countries maintained real interest rates which were either negative or zero. The pendulum 
swung towards monetary rigour when inflationary pressures showed their persistence and, at the same 
time, the monetary hardening led since 1979 by the Federal Reserve of the USA stimulated the grow-
ing exit of European capital from the country. Nominal interest rates were between 4 and 6 points 
above inflation and rates of exchange remained almost fixed from the middle of the eighties, extending 
that situation until the crisis which shook up the European currencies in September 1992. The Maas-
tricht Treaty meant that since the summer of the following year anti-inflationist rigour was again im-
posed, slightly toned down during the process of the creation and functioning of the single currency in 
what has been called the Brussels-Frankfurt Pact between the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Central Bank. 
Therefore, the weakening of industrial profit, financial supremacy, deregulation of markets and 
the restrictions imposed by the budgetary and monetary policies destroyed the institutional order cre-
ated in the Golden Age and became adverse factors for the growth of salaries, investment in produc-
tive activity, public expenditure and redistributive activity by governments. 
 
3.2 Deceleration of labour productivity and limitation on demand 
The evolution of productivity per hour worked (table 1) reveals that its growth rate was cut drasti-
cally during the sixties. It was also a persistent deceleration to the extent that in 1994-2004 the major-
ity of the countries showed growth rates less than those registered in previous periods and much less 
than those reached during the Golden Age. The average of the EU-14 (considered according to the 
relative weight of each country in the aggregate GDP of the 14, measured in dollars according to Par-
ity Purchasing Power) reduced its average growth rate successively from 4.9 percent annually in 1960-
73, to 3.1 percent in 1974-84, to 2.3 percent in 1984-93 and, finally, to 1.7 percent in 1994-2004. 
When we consider the two last periods, Ireland shows a growth rate superior to 4% annually and 
only three countries (Finland, Portugal and Austria) exceed 2.5% annually in any of the two periods. 
The other countries are around 2% annually, except Italy, the Netherlands and Spain which have lower 
rates. In the last period (1994-2004), without considering Ireland, only Greece and Austria are above 
2.5% and in the case of the three “tortoises”, to use the expression of Dew-Becker and Gordon (2006), 
the Netherlands and Italy hardly even exceed 1% and Spain does not even reach that meagre rate of 
growth in productivity. 
It is clear, therefore, that since the sixties the economic dynamic in the European countries is 
characterised by a simultaneous weakening in domestic demand and labour productivity, with the sole 
exception of Ireland. Graphic 1 represents the evolution of both variables between 1960 and 2004. The 
linear adjustment of annual growth rates gives a straight line with a pretty positive gradient and a coef-
ficient of acceptable determination. It can be seen that the largest rises (annual rates of 4% annually) 
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correspond to the four countries which started off with levels of development which were further be-
hind than the others, although the increase in productivity in Spain is clearly inferior to the increases 
of the other three. The other countries are found in coordinates defined by growth rates around 3%, 
below the positions of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. 
That said, if the same graphic is drawn up for each of the cyclical periods it can be noted that only 
in 1960-73 is there a similar match between rates of growth in domestic demand and productivity, 
with a straight line with a gradient of almost 45º and an R2 of 0.59. By contrast, in the three subse-
quent periods, in other words when demand is weakening and productivity is decelerating, the data 
sample is more disperse, the straight line reduces its gradient and the adjustment is weak21. In fact, the 
correlation between the annual rates of variation of both variables is very weak in almost all the coun-
tries. 
 
 
Graphic 1. Evolution of domestic demand and productivity: 1960-2004: Average rates of annual variation. 
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Therefore, the empirical evidence supports the theory that, in the first instance, there is a struc-
tural conditioning of productivity on domestic demand but there is not a direct and uniform causal 
relationship. That structural conditioning is what explains the rapid growth in demand during the 
Golden Age which drove an intense increase in productivity, through the three channels highlighted. 
The increase in the market (the scaling effect) provided the incentive for a larger use of the installed 
capacity, reducing the capital-output ratio. The strong growth in foreign investment generated a capi-
                                               
     
21
  The determining coefficients for the three periods are: 0.26; 0.01 and 0.35. 
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talisation effect which increased the capital-labour ratio and a modernisation effect which accentuated 
the fall in the capital-output ratio and/or the increase in the intensity of capital. 
Subsequently, the weakening in demand held down those three effects and structurally condi-
tioned productivity growth, meaning that it does not grow at a high rate even when the economy has a 
new wealth of technological innovations as is the case in the nineties22. So, the weakening in demand 
came followed by the slowing down of productivity increases. In the same way, when the results for 
the countries for the period 1994-2004 are compared with those recorded during the previous 10 years, 
some degree of improvement in the rate of increase in domestic demand is accompanied by a similar 
evolution in productivity (Greece, Sweden, the Netherlands), while the worsening of domestic demand 
is accompanied by a falling back in the rate of productivity growth (Portugal, France, Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy). 
However, the absence of a direct and uniform causal relationship can be seen in the fact that – 
within its mediocre growth rate – the productivity of the different countries contains margins of varia-
tions which are not directly defined by the performance of demand, as is manifestly revealed when we 
note the evolution of both variables (table 1). In this sense, the anomalies or most significant lack of 
connection are the following: 
■  Spain is – along with Greece – the country which achieves a larger increase in domestic de-
mand (leaving Ireland aside), with an average rate of 3.9% annually, and at the same time re-
cords the lowest increase in productivity (0.7% annually). 
■   Finland substantially increases its rate of increase in domestic demand compared to the previ-
ous period (0.4% to 3.3%) while the rate of productivity growth is reduced (3.1% to 2.3%). 
■  Denmark presents a similar case since its rate of demand increases (1.6% to 1.7%) but the pro-
ductivity rate falls (2.7% to 1,6%).  
■  Another anomaly takes place in the United Kingdom: with rising demand (2.7% to 3.4%) while 
productivity sees a slight reduction in its growth rate (2.2% to 2.1%). 
■  Austria presents the reverse situation since demand weakens its growth (2.4% to 1.7%) while 
productivity growth rate increases (2.3% to 2.7%). 
In precise terms, the explanation for the lack of matches and, more in general, for the low coeffi-
cients in determination between the rates of variation in demand and productivity in the seventies, is to 
be found in the modifications which the labour market underwent during those periods. 
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 A strong correlation can be observed between the variations in fixed investment and the net-product capital 
ratio, both during the period 1960-2004 and in the four periods. The correlation is only weak in three cases (Ire-
land, the Netherlands and Portugal). At the same time, a good correlation between the variations in net-product 
capital and productivity can be observed, above all in the periods 1960-73 and 1974-83. But the correlation be-
comes smaller in the last two periods, improving the correlation between the variations in capital intensity and 
productivity. That fits with the theory which is laid out in the next section on changes to the labour market and 
its relationship to productivity. 
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4.  PRODUCTIVITY AND CHANGES IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
4.1. From the erosion to the disappearance of the "labour market" of the Golden Age 
During the post-war decades acceleration in productivity took place within an archetype or model 
of labour market made up of seven main features23: 
a) Relative stability in its activity rate (active population / population of a working age) which fol-
lowed a slight fall in the majority of the countries (table 2). 
b) Limited employment creation. The level of occupation grew slowly while the number of hours 
worked per employee fell, so that total employment in hours worked registered a minimal increment 
and even fell in various countries (table 2). 
c) Minimal unemployment rate. In the majority of countries it represented less than 2% of the ac-
tive population and only in three was it between 4.5% and 5.5% (table 2). 
d) A notable increase in real salaries. The real wage per employee grew above 5% annual in half 
the countries and only in three countries was it below 4% (table 3). 
e) Social pacts established through centralised negotiation between employees and entrepreneurs 
which institutionalised the distributive struggle through the adjustment between salaries and produc-
tivity. 
f) Employment protection through public regulations which protected the right to work of workers 
and set dismissal costs. 
g) Public aid to the unemployed and social benefits for the non-active population, awarded by the 
social policies of the Welfare State. 
The erosion of that model began with the harsh labour adjustment which was produced in the pe-
riod 1974 and 1983. While the activity rate showed a larger diversity of performance between the 
countries (table 2), total employment by hours worked contracted sharply – in many countries at an 
annual rate superior to 1% - due to which the level of occupation was weakened at the same time as 
the number of hours per active person rapidly diminished. As a consequence, the unemployment rate 
rose in a significant way, coming close to 10% in Spain and Ireland and reaching 6-7% in the other 
five countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
     
23
  See Marglin-Schor (1990), Howell (2004), Stockbammer (2004), Aiginer (2004), Cette (2000) and Eatwell 
(1996), Setterfield and Cornwall (2002). 
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Table 2. Evolution of the labour market: average rates of annual variation in each period. 
1960-
1973 
1974-
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994-
2004 
1960-
1973 
1974-
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994-
2004 
1960-
1973 
1974-
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994-
2004 
1994 2000 2004 
 
Labour force / Pop working age (aver-
age rates of annual variation) 
Employed population / Labour Force 
(average rates of annual variation) Unemployment / Labour Force (percentage) 
Austria -0.4 -0.1 0.8 0.1 0.3 -0.5 -0.8 0.0 1.8 1.7 3.3 4.1 3,8 3,6 4,8 
Belgium 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.5 0.0 -0.9 0.2 0.0 1.9 7.1 8.6 8.5 9,8 6,9 8,4 
Denmark 0.6 0.4 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -0.6 0.6 1.0 5.9 7.0 5.5 7,7 4,3 5,5 
Finland -0.7 0.8 -0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.9 -1.4 0.9 2.3 4.8 6.5 11.5 16,6 9,8 8,8 
France -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 2.0 5.6 9.5 10.3 11,7 9,1 9,6 
Germany a -0.2 -0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.2 0.7 3.7 5.9 8.4 8,3 7,2 9,5 
Greece -1.1 0.4 -0.3 1.0 0.3 -0.6 -0.1 -0.7 4.4 3.1 7.1 10.3 8,9 11,3 10,5 
Ireland -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 1.1 0.0 -0.9 -0.4 1.1 5.6 9.5 15.6 7.6 14,3 4,3 4,5 
Italy -0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.7 0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.2 4.9 6.7 9.0 10.1 10,6 10,1 8,0 
Netherlands 0.1 -1.1 1.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.7 0.2 0.1 1.1 6.7 6.9 4.3 6,8 2,8 4,6 
Portugal 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.6 0.3 -2.0 -0.1 -0.2 2.5 6.6 6.4 5.8 6,9 4,0 6,7 
Spain 0.1 -0.9 0.4 1.7 -0.1 -1.6 -0.1 0.3 2.6 9.0 15.7 14.0 19,5 11,1 10,6 
Sweden 0.1 0.8 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 1.9 2.3 3.4 7.3 9,4 5,6 6,3 
United Kingdom 0.1 0.0 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 0.7 1.9 6.0 9.5 6.3 9,3 5,4 4,7 
 
Total employment (total hours worked) 
(average rates of annual variation) 
Number of employed people 
(average rates of annual variation) 
Hours worked per person engaged  
(average rats of annual variation) 
 
Austria -0.7 -0.7 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -0.5 -0.9    
Belgium -1.1 -1.2 0.0 0.7 0.5 -0.4 0.6 0.8 -1.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.1    
Denmark 0.7 -1.1 -1.0 0.8 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 -0.4 -1.1 -1.1 0.2    
Finland -0.1 -0.2 -2.1 1.3 0.4 0.4 -1.7 1.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 0.0    
France 0.0 -1.3 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.9 -0.7 -1.5 -0.3 -0.6    
Germany a -0.8 -1.1 0.0 -0.3 0.3 -0.1 1.2 0.3 -1.1 -1.0 -1.2 -0.6    
Greece -0.9 0.3 0.5 0.7 -0.5 1.0 0.6 0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2    
Ireland -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 3.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 4.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0    
Italy -1.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 -0.3 0.6 0.4 0.8 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2    
Netherlands 0.1 -1.7 1.8 1.3 1.4 -0.5 2.7 1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -0.8 -0.2    
Portugal -0.3 -1.0 -0.3 0.5 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.9 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4    
Spain 1.0 -2.3 0.6 2.8 0.7 -1.3 1.1 2.9 0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -0.1    
Sweden -0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 -0.4 0.5 -1.1 -0.7 0.3 0.0    
United Kingdom -0.5 -1.4 0.2 0.9 0.3 -0.4 0.7 1.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.5 -0.1    
a)In order to guarantee the coherence of the data prior to and after reunification in 1990, the series of the period 1984-93 has been created from 1991 by applying the variation 
rates of the unified country to the FDR data. Drawn up from Annual-Macroeconomic Database (AMECO) and Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) Data-
base. 
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Simultaneously, real compensation per employee slowed in growth to half the previous period 
(2.25% annually as an average of the EU-14) although the maintenance of centralised negotiation con-
tinued to give workers a certain negotiating capacity. In the same way, in most of the countries – al-
though to a greater or lesser degree – the main forms of employment protection were maintained and 
public aid was given to the unemployed and to other sectors. The fact that the adjustment to a crisis 
situation was centred on employment is what allowed the deceleration in labour productivity to be of a 
weaker intensity than the reduction from which demand suffered. As a simple average in the EU-14, 
while the rate of growth in domestic demand fell from 5.3% to 1.8%, as respective annual averages for 
the periods 1960-73 and 1974-83, the increment in productivity slowed more smoothly, passing from 
5.6% to 3% (table 1). 
The disappearance of the characteristics of the post-war labour model was almost complete over 
the course of the following period, between 1984-93. The rate of activity grew in almost all the coun-
tries while total employment continued to show negative variations, since even when the level of em-
ployment began to grow again, the number of hours per person engaged shrank more quickly (table 2). 
As a consequence, unemployment continued its upward trend, in an exaggerated way in Ireland and 
Spain but also reaching levels of 10% in four other countries and attaining rates above 6% in the re-
maining countries, except Austria and Sweden whose governments continued intent on their commit-
ment to maintain low percentages of unemployment. 
In parallel, the model suffered a harsh political and entrepreneurial attack on the rest of its com-
ponents. Real compensation hardly rose (an average of 1.4% in the EU-14), meaning salaries as a pro-
portion of income fell back in a generalised way, with losses of three to five points in almost all the 
countries (table 3) compared to the proportion reached in the previous period. In various countries the 
system of union negotiation was modified, eliminating or debilitating its centralised nature at the same 
time as budgetary policies limited social benefits and contractual forms were introduced which dimin-
ished employment protection. 
Nevertheless, during those years a rather varied panorama of situations could be observed, pre-
cisely because the disappearance of the basic uniformity of the Golden Age gave way to diverse evolu-
tion depending on the countries. That is why in terms of total employment, while countries like 
Finland and Denmark were suffering losses of 2% and 1% annually, others like Greece and Spain pre-
sented positive rates of 0.5% and the Netherlands came close to 2% annually, and the nine remaining 
countries showed rates of variation of scarcely a tenth. That diversity of performance was carried over 
to the relationship which existed between the dynamics of demand and productivity, in such a way that 
Spain and the Netherlands which had increases in domestic demand superior to the Nordic countries 
nevertheless obtained inferior increases in terms of productivity, above all the Netherlands whose ex-
tremely strong creation of employment hardly left any margin for an increase in productivity less than 
1% a year. 
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Table 3. Salary evolution. 
1960-
1973 
1974-
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994- 
2004 
1960- 
1973 
1974-
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994-
2004 
 
Real compensation per employee *  
(average rates per annual variation) 
 
Proportion of Compensation per Em-
ployee in the GDP at market prices (%). 
Average for each period 
Variation 
1994/2004 
compared 
to 
1974/1983 
(points) 
Austria 4.6 2.4 1.9 0.9 72.8 73.9 69.2 64.8 -9.1 
Belgium 5.0 3.0 1.4 1.1 57.0 65.3 62.7 62.1 -3.2 
Denmark 3.6 1.1 1.1 1.5 61.6 63.0 59.8 57.1 -5.9 
Finland 4.1 2.4 2.3 1.4 67.0 65.4 63.7 55.9 -9.6 
France 4.6 3.0 1.1 1.1 61.9 65.5 60.3 57.5 -8.1 
Germany a 4.5 1.6 1.4 1.7 62.2 65.0 61.6 59.0 -6.0 
Greece 5.5 2.3 -1.2 2.5 74.4 65.9 64.7 58.7 -7.2 
Ireland 3.9 3.4 2.7 1.2 67.8 68.2 61.9 51.5 -16.7 
Italy 5.7 1.9 1.1 0.0 65.9 67.6 62.5 54.9 -12.7 
Netherlands 5.1 1.7 1.0 0.9 62.0 66.8 61.2 59.3 -7.5 
Portugal 6.7 3.6 2.4 1.5 61.6 73.9 61.9 61.8 -12.6 
Spain 7.0 3.1 1.4 -0.5 64.4 66.7 61.0 58.9 -7.8 
Sweden 3.4 0.9 1.2 2.5 64.5 66.2 60.3 57.9 -8.3 
U.Kingdom 3.0 1.2 2.0 1.7 65.7 67.1 65.5 63.6 -3.5 
* Deflated according to the GDP deflator. 
a)In order to guarantee the coherence of the data prior to and after reunification in 1990, the series of the period 
1984-93 has been created from 1991 by applying the variation rates of the unified country to the FDR data. 
Drawn up from Annual-Macroeconomic Database (AMECO). 
 
 
4.2. “Maastricht Treaty”: employment creation and productivity weakening 
The erosion of that labour model became completely spent and the diversity of country situations 
gave way to the reconstruction of a certain uniformity in the labour market during the nineties, al-
though the notable differences registered by the EU-14 in terms of the creation of employment would 
have important consequences for the evolution of labour productivity. 
At the start of the decade, European leaders had to face a raw reality: the harshness of the labour 
adjustment of the sixties, followed by a weak capacity for employment creation – while the activity 
rate increased – had generated a growing structural unemployment which made the incorporation of 
inactive sections of society (young people, women) difficult, and the reentry to employment of a 
growing percentage of long-term unemployed, above all among less-qualified workers and older 
workers. 
In those years, in the middle of a consolidation of financial predominance and of the orthodox 
policies in the fiscal and monetary sphere, a new labour model became accepted, one which was poles 
apart from the one built up during the Golden Age. From the European summits in Edinburgh in 1992 
and in Essen in 1994, to the “Pact for Stability and Growth” in 1997 and the “Lisbon Strategy” in 
2002, the triumph of the thesis which declared the “rigidities” of the continental European labour mar-
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ket and the necessity to assimilate the market to the “flexible” working of the United States and the 
United Kingdom was gradually established.24. 
The Maastricht Strategy, maintained afterwards by the Brussels-Frankfurt Pact, prepared to re-
form the labour market in order to promote employment, above all among the sections of society 
which were most affected by inactivity and unemployment. 
The measures as a whole which were adopted can be classified as two types of actions25. One type 
was directly aimed at the cheapening of company labour costs, through subsidies and tax breaks and 
cuts to social security quotas. Other measures were aimed at increasing employment turnover, conced-
ing more measures to help dismissals, cutting employee rights, encouraging temporary contracts and 
part-time contracts, limiting overtime and other regulations with a tendency to reduce working time. 
In some countries, where governments maintain a larger social commitment, measures tending to 
promote employment mobility and the loss of employment stability have been combined with active 
policies designed to increase professional training and to guarantee employee protection suring periods 
when employees find themselves out of work. The clearest case of this in practice are the flexisecurity 
reforms applied in Denmark or the promotion of part-time work in the Netherlands since the eighties 
which has been carried out in conditions which fully guarantee employee rights. However, in the ma-
jority of cases, “structural” reforms of the labour market have directly supposed the dismantling of 
basic pillars, such as centralised negotiation, which facilitated the homogeneity of salaries and labour 
rights. The result has been a slow increase in wages, the weakening or disappearance of the mecha-
nisms of employment protection, employment which is increasingly precarious, increasing contracts 
which are detrimental to full-time work stability and the weakening of unemployment benefits. 
In this way, during the period 1994-2004, a radical transformation in labour conditions in Euro-
pean countries was promoted26, which has had a large influence on the performance of labour produc-
tivity in European countries. 
The objective of increasing employment was irrefutably reached in the EU-14. The employment 
level reached positive rates in the 14 countries, exceeding 1% annually in the United Kingdom, 
Finland and the Netherlands, coming close to 3% in Spain and exceeding 4% in Ireland. In terms of 
total employment in hours worked, 12 countries recorded positive rates even if the number of hours 
per occupied person only fell in a significant way in Ireland and France, falling very slightly in the 
other countries. Total employment grew strongly, by around 3% annually in Ireland and Spain; above 
1% annually in the Netherlands and Finland; and among the other six countries, it was only in France 
where the rate did not exceed 0.5% annually (table 2). The only two countries where total employment 
                                               
       
24
 Pisani-Ferry (2004) run through the elements contained in those theories, argued for many years by au-
thors like those cited in note seven.  
      
25
  Artus and Cette (2004) includes an annex in which the main measures are detailed (pp. 217 and ss), as 
they also are by successive editions of Employment Outlook published by the OECD. 
      
26
  Changes to the labour market are analysed in Cette (2000), Aiginer (2004), Groot et al (2004), Stock-
bammer (2004), Buchele and Christiansen (1999), Mitchell et al (2006), Welters and Muysken (2002). 
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did not grow were Austria and Germany where the fall in the number of hours per person engaged was 
greater than the increase in the number of employed people. 
Nevertheless, the goal of reducing unemployment was achieved in a more limited way. In some 
cases because the rate of job creation has not been quick and in other cases because that speed has 
been partially offset by an equally strong increase in the labour force participation rate, either for en-
dogenous demographical reasons, because of the inflow of immigrants, or because of the expectations 
which have been created between inactive social groups attracted to the labour market27. Almost all 
the countries, except Greece and Italy, managed to achieve a fall in the unemployment rate until the 
end of the decade, but several of them saw it rise again during the recession initiated in 2000. If the 
whole period is considered, one notes the largest falls in unemployment have been recorded in the 
three countries (Spain, Finland and Ireland) which initially showed very high rates – between 20% and 
14% - as well as in the United Kingdom and Sweden (table 2). That said, at the end of those years, in 
2004, half the countries in the EU-14 continued carrying unemployment above 8% of the active popu-
lation. 
In that process, the convergence of various phenomena occurred which have conspired against 
salaries. A large part of the jobs created have been low-skilled jobs, through part-time contracts and/or 
of a limited time duration, above all with the incorporation of women who previously remained inac-
tive or unemployed28, and in various countries (Spain, Ireland, Italy) with an important contribution 
from immigrants. Simultaneously, levels of unemployment have been maintained which continue to be 
significant, at the same time that the mechanisms of centralised negotiation have deteriorated or disap-
peared, as well as the frameworks which protected stable work and full-time work. Such a combina-
tion of elements has resulted in real compensation per employee barely growing 1.2% annually on 
average in the EU-14, with some countries with zero or negative average rates (Spain, Italy), or less 
than that average (the Netherlands, Austria). 
As a consequence, when what has happened to salaries since the eighties is observed, we can see 
that an economic scenario characterised by financial supremacy and orthodox economic policies (in-
cluding the employment policies) has led to a sharp distribution of income which is contrary to the 
salaries perceived by workers. Table 3 shows how, during these last two decades, various countries 
suffered losses of 12 to 15 points on GDP, in Ireland, Italy and Portugal; of seven to 10 points in 
                                               
     
27
  The activity rate increased by more than 1% annually in Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands and Greece; while 
the occupation rate did so by 1% only in Ireland and Finland (table 2). As an average for the period, only in 
Ireland was the activity rate less than 60%, being between 61-63% in Belgium, Greece and Spain, 66-68% in 
Germany and Ireland, 71-74% in Austria, Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom, reaching maximums of 77-
78% in Denmark and Sweden. Source: AMECO.  
     
28
 The activity rate of women has experienced strong increases which have exceeded 12 percentage points in 
Ireland (45% to 58%), Spain (41% to 53%) and the Netherlands (56% to 68%), it did so 6-8 points in Greece 
(42% to 50%), Italy (42% to 48%), Belgium (50% to 56%) and Portugal (59% to 65%). Precisely it has does so 
less intensely in those countries which already had higher female activity rates: four points in Germany (60% to 
64%), France (59% to 63%), Austria (61% to 65%), Finland (69% to 73%), one or two points in Sweden (75% to 
76%) and the United Kingdom (66% to 68%), falling slightly in Denmark (77% to 76%). Source: AMECO.  
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Finland, Austria, France, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden. Only in four countries were the 
losses between three to five points of GDP. 
Aside from that regressive redistribution of income, the greatest “paradox” caused by the labour 
reform undertaken in the name of employment creation, flexibility and labour market efficiency has 
been its negative impact on labour productivity. The anomalies which were detected at the end of the 
third section between the dynamic of domestic demand and the performance of productivity in the 
period 1994-2004 are precisely explained by the evolution of the labour market and its effect on em-
ployment creation. 
The most significant case is that of Spain whose domestic demand is the one which grows most in 
the EU (3.9% annually) – leaving aside Ireland – but its productivity only increases 0.7% annually. 
The same lack of connection is observed in Finland, Denmark and the United Kingdom while the 
weak increase in productivity in the Netherlands remains striking. All of them are countries which 
have achieved major increases in employment according to the conditions mentioned above. At the 
other extreme is Austria, whose demand has weakened its growth while productivity increased it, so 
that it has recorded a falling back in its level of total employment. 
We find ourselves therefore looking at the inverse situation to the one generated in 1974-1983. 
The economic crisis imposed a harsh labour adjustment, with a strong attack on employment, in such a 
way that productivity slowed its pace of growth rather less than domestic demand. In 1994-2004, the 
mediocre growth in demand led to a substantially lower increase in labour productivity with shortfalls 
which expanded according to the amount of employment creation which the abovementioned countries 
had achieved. A large part of that employment is low-skilled, frequently substituted work which pre-
viously demanded more skills, is weakly paid, and is found in construction, service and low value-
added manufacturing, which means its contribution to the overall efficiency of the economy is limited. 
To put it another way, within the limitation which operates on demand, that increase in employment 
breaks the rise in capital intensity and is concentrated in activities where the capital-output ratio falls 
little or even increases, so that both aspects limit the capacity for productivity growth [∆Y/L ≡ ∆K/L  
─ ∆K/Y]. 
 
5. GROWTH STYLES: EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY. 
Analysis of the empirical evidence leads to the hypothesis that an important change in the style of 
economic growth in European countries has been taking place since the nineties which can be ob-
served in a crystal-clear way through the data in table 4 and graphic 2. The table presents the signifi-
cance of new employment to economic growth expressed by employment-GDP elasticity, in other 
words, the variation in employment (total people engaged and total hours worked) compared to the 
GDP variation. We can see here that during the decade of the Golden Age the economic growth of the 
14 countries gives rise to a weak sensitivity in terms of employment level which becomes slightly 
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negative in the case of total employment. In fact, only three countries (Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Spain) reach positive values and those are less than 0.15. 
During the following decades we see an impoverishment in the significance of work in a slowing 
economic growth. In 1974-1983, except in three countries, the elasticity between employment and 
GDP becomes more negative and in spite of the fact that that tendency is attenuated in 1984-1993, in 
terms of total employment, six countries continue with negative values, another two have a null value 
and another three have positive values lower than 0.10; only Portugal, Greece and, above all, the 
Netherlands, give higher values, in other words, employment has played a larger role in their eco-
nomic growth. 
Conditions are modified substantially in the period 1994-2004 when in a generalised way elastic-
ity registers positive values rather higher than those previously registered. That is not the case in Aus-
tria, Germany and Greece where elasticity in terms of occupation level is positive but falling back 
while Greece also sees a fall in total employment terms and the other two countries record negative 
values. Another particular case is the Netherlands where the elasticity value diminishes but remains 
high, since in the previous period it had reached very high values. In the other 10 countries it can be 
clearly seen that production growth includes a larger contribution from labour, especially in Spain, but 
also in Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom with values of around 0.30, 
below 0.20 in France, Portugal and Sweden. 
 
Table 4. The relationship between variations in employment and GDP*  
 
1960- 
1973 
1974- 
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994-
2004 
1960- 
1973 
1974- 
1983 
1984-
1993 
1994-
2004 
 Total Employment (people engaged) Total employment (hours worked) 
Austria 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.20 -0.11 -0.26 0.04 -0.15 
Belgium 0.07 -0.20 0.25 0.31 -0.16 -0.56 0.01 0.28 
Denmark 0.20 -0.03 0.08 0.25 0.12 -0.92 -0.53 0.32 
Finland 0.07 0.12 -1.44 0.33 -0.01 -0.05 -1.75 0.32 
France 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.38 0.00 -0.43 -0.06 0.13 
Germany a 0.05 -0.05 0.38 0.19 -0.14 -0.58 0.00 -0.15 
Greece -0.03 0.57 0.44 0.21  0.19 0.37 0.16 
Ireland 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.44 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 0.32 
Italy -0.03 0.20 0.15 0.46 -0.17 0.04 0.00 0.34 
Netherlands 0.23 -0.25 1.00 0.56 0.02 -0.85 0.66 0.47 
Portugal 0.03 -0.13 0.08 0.31 -0.05 -0.35 -0.08 0.17 
Spain 0.06 -0.62) 0.36 0.81 0.08 -1.08 0.19 0.78 
Sweden 0.11 0.46 -0.28 0.15 -0.08 0.02 -0.08 0.17 
United Kingdom 0.08 -0.35 0.27 0.32 -0.10 -1.16 0.06 0.28 
* [(En-E0) / Eo]/[(Yn-Y0) / Yo)] 
a)In order to guarantee the coherence of the data prior to and after reunification in 1990, the series of the period 
1984-93 has been created from 1991 by applying the variation rates of the unified country to the FDR data. 
Drawn up from (AMECO) and GGDC. 
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Equally, the transformation in the style of growth is captured clearly by analysing the correlation 
which exists between the annual variations in productivity and the annual variations in production and 
employment, respectively. Graphic 2 presents the sequence of both correlations throughout the four 
periods which span 1960-2004. 
Firstly, in 1960-1973, almost all the countries are found in the upper right part of the fourth square 
whose coordinates are delimited by high values in the correlation between productivity and GDP and 
low negative values in the correlation between productivity and employment. Therefore, during that 
period of strong economic growth the strong connection is the one which relates the dynamics of pro-
ductivity and production. 
Following on, in 1974-1983, the high positive correlation between productivity and GDP is main-
tained and the low correlation between productivity and employment but with two new elements. 
There are more countries where the productivity-employment correlation, although low, is positive. In 
addition, three countries record a low productivity-GDP correlation, of which two, France and the 
Netherlands, record high negative correlations between variations in productivity and employment. 
Later, in 1984-1993, although 10 of the 14 countries are found in the fourth square, the sample become 
more spread out, combining a wide range of negative values in the productivity-employment correla-
tion and positive values in the productivity-GDP correlation. The exceptions are Germany and Austria, 
with positive values in the case of employment, and the United Kingdom and Spain with negative 
values in the case of production. 
Finally, in the period 1994-2000 most of the countries move to the lower part of the fourth square 
defined by coordinates which refer to medium and high negative values in the productivity-
employment correlation (six exceed -0.75 and another four -0.5), with more disperse values in the 
productivity-GDP correlation where only five countries exceed the value -0.5. Therefore, the graphic 
representation confirms the thesis that in the nineties an economic context was created in which a tight 
relationship between the variations in productivity and employment was consolidated, the extremes of 
which are the two countries situated in the third square, Spain (with strong employment creation and 
weak productivity creation) and Austria (with falling total employment and larger productivity crea-
tion). 
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Graphic 2. Correlations between the annual variations in productivity per hour of work and the variations in 
GDP and employment in hours worked. 
                       
 
                               2a)  1960-197 3                                                                     2b ) 197 4 -198 3 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper formulates an interpretative proposal which explains the dynamic of labour productiv-
ity through two levels of determination. In the first instance, aggregated demand determines effective 
production and mediates the performance of productivity through three channels or effects: scaling, 
capitalisation and modernisation. In the second instance, in the face of either an expansive or recessive 
context in demand, modifications in the labour market directly affect the role played by employment 
and, because of that, they affect productivity too.  
The empirical evidence reveals two simultaneous facts in the European economies from 1974: on 
the one hand, the intense deceleration in domestic demand which affects all the EU-14 countries in a 
generalised way; on the other hand, the persistent fall in the rate of labour productivity. The only ex-
ception is Ireland where the massive inflow of foreign investment has managed to maintain a notable 
rate of growth in demand and productivity. 
The linear adjustment in annual rates of growth in both variables, both in the period 1960-2004 as 
well as in the period of the Golden Age, is represented by straight lines with rather positive gradients 
and with acceptable determination coefficients. However, the adjustment loses statistical quality in the 
last periods, in other words when demand weakens and productivity slows down. Therefore, the analy-
sis suggests a structural conditioning of domestic demand on productivity but that there is no direct 
causal and uniform relationship. 
In that sense, the Maastricht Strategy has become a severe limitation on labour productivity 
growth in the way in which it places obstacles on salary growth, productive investment and public 
expenditure. The slowing down in domestic demand breaks the impact on the three expansive effects 
which productivity exercises, even in the presence of a new wealth of technological innovations as is 
the case in the nineties. The limitations on market expansion (scaling effect) limit the degree of use of 
installed capacity and, with it, the reduction in the capital-output ratio. The moderate increase in for-
eign investment breaks the increase in the capital-work ratio and the fall in the capital-output ratio in 
the way in which it limits the effects of capitalisation and modernisation. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence centred on the period 1994-2004 also shows that there is not 
a direct and uniform causal relationship, but that a mediocre productivity growth rate has margins of 
variation which are not defined exclusively and directly by demand. If results from that period are 
compared with those recorded in the previous period, it can be noted that a certain improvement in the 
internal growth rate is accompanied by a similar evolution in productivity (Greece, Sweden, the Neth-
erlands) while a worsening in the internal growth rate is matched by a falling back in the productivity 
rate (Portugal, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy), but the match between both variables is upset in the 
cases of Spain, Finland, Denmark and Austria. 
The explanation for those anomalies is found in the changes promoted in the labour market which 
have led to a radical transformation in the labour model created during the Golden Age and which is 
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negatively affecting the performance of labour productivity in European countries. The aim of reduc-
ing high unemployment rates through labour policies based on the thesis which decried the “rigidities” 
of the labour market has made a notable increase in employment possible in parallel with the disman-
tling of centralised negotiation, the starving of salary rises, the reduction in company labour costs, the 
proliferation of low-skilled jobs, the weakening in employment protection, the multiplying of part-
time and temporary contracts – at the cost of full-time work stability – and the reduction in unem-
ployment benefits. 
The analysis of the empirical evidence reveals that in 1994-2004 the style of economic growth in 
European countries has changed. The employment-GDP elasticity during the period 1994-2004 regis-
ters rising positive values. At the same time, the correlation between the variations in productivity and 
the respective variations in production and employment in the majority of countries presents a high 
(negative) correlation between the dynamics of productivity and employment. 
Consequently, the countries where growth has incorporated a larger amount of employment 
(Spain, Finland, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands) are the countries which present a 
larger deviation between domestic demand growth and productivity growth, which in a context of 
weakness in demand means that the increase in productivity is reduced the more employment in-
creases because employment slows the increase in capital intensity and is concentrated in activities 
where the capital-output ratio reduces little and even rises. The opposite situation is observed in Aus-
tria where a fall in the rate of employment means an increase in productivity above the rise in domes-
tic demand. 
The appropriateness of this diagnosis of the situation in European countries can be projected onto 
a diagnosis of the policies which could be effective in increasing labour productivity. The only way of 
making the significant creation of employment compatible with a larger increase in labour productiv-
ity is through making domestic demand strongly dynamic, something which is evidently related to 
research efforts, educational training and investment in new technologies, but also related to a larger 
consumer capacity through salaries, the incentive given to productive investment and the recovery of 
economic and social commitments by governments. In other words, with the abandoning of the Maas-
tricht Strategy and its substitution for another which is in keeping with the achievement of the objec-
tives mentioned. 
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